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A Retreat from Säger?
Servicing or Fine-Tuning the Application of Article 49 EC
By Jochen Meulman and Henri de Waele*
1. Introduction
Tumultuous developments have stalked the Court of Justice’s case-law on the
free movement of services over the course of the past decade. Ever since the
seminal Säger1 case of 1991, there has been a steady increase in the number of
times the Court has been asked to express itself on the scope and limits of
Article 49 EC.2 Yet, though delivering clarity must have served as the underly-
ing objective, the harvest reaped amounts rather much to the opposite. The
treatment of abuse of law in the free movement of services,3 and the trend of
the progressive marginalization of the transnational element and corollary situ-
ations of reverse discrimination4 have already put past commentators at pains,
and seem to have marred legal consistency in the field.5 Any attempt to delin-
eate exactly how far the prohibition of Article 49 EC actually extends nowa-
days has become overall one of the most complicated ventures. The present
contribution is nonetheless devoted to this issue. As will be set forth, there are
reasons to believe that the scope of application of Article 49 is shifting, not
least because of possible new directions in case-law. If these were to set a trend,
it will be argued, a retreat from Säger, if not initiated yet, may be impending.
For some time, Säger served as a trusty beacon. As known, the case made
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1. Case C-76/90, M. Säger v. Dennemayer & Co. Ltd., [1991] ECR I-4221.
2. Thus contrasting with the period of relative inactivity up to 1991, when the ECJ would render
on average judgment in roughly three services cases a year.
3. See Case C-148/91, Vereniging Veronica Omroep Organisatie v. Commissariaat voor de Media,
[1993] ECR I-487; C-23/93, TV10 SA v. Commissariaat voor de Media, [1994] ECR I-4795;
Case C-56/96, VT4 Ltd. v. Vlaamse Gemeenschap, [1997] ECR I-3143.
4. See inter alia Case C-484/93, Svensson and Gustavsson v. Ministre du Logement et d’Urbanisme,
[1995] ECR I-3955; Case C-398/95, SETTG v. Ypourgos Ergasias [1997] ECR I-3113.
5. See e.g. N. Bernard, ‘Discrimination and Free Movement in E.C. Law’ (1996) 45 ICLQ 82; A.
Kjellgren, ‘On the Border of Abuse: The Jurisprudence of the ECJ on Circumvention, Fraud
and Abuses of Community Law’, in M. Andenas & W.-H. Roth (eds.), Services and Free Move-
ment in EU Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); V. Hatzopoulos, ‘Recent Develop-
ments of the Case-Law of the ECJ in the Field of Services’, (2000) 37 C.M.L.Rev., p. 43; C.
Barnard, ‘Fitting the Remaining Pieces into the Goods and Persons Jigsaw?’ (2001) 26 E.L.Rev.,
p. 35.
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leeway in regard of the free movement of goods by introducing a Cassis6-like
approach, and further extended the provision’s material grasp by demanding
abolition of any restrictions, even when entirely non-discriminatory.7 The
judgments in Alpine8 and in Schindler9 underlined this approach, and though
the Säger formula was not adhered to verbatim there, it has figured in most
case-law of late.10 So far, the scope of Article 49 was seemingly delimited
clearly. Yet, the absence of a Keck11-type of rule in the free movement of
services, which could function to exclude a priori certain domestic rules from
the grasp of the ‘no obstacles’ doctrine, exposes the troublesome ramifications
of the latter, looming large in recent judgments. For, in the absence of harmo-
nization, Member States continue to uphold a plethora of rules relating to
market circumstances which, in light of the EC provisions on services, may or
may not be considered outlawed by now. In principle, these could be justified,
as long as actions by the host and the home Member States in the protection
of particular interests are taken into account alike. Yet, this does not prevent a
rise in the amount of complaints lodged and a subsequent high tide of litiga-
tion, as long as it remains unclear from the outset what obstacles are capable of
preventing or substantially impeding market access for service providers and
recipients. From an efficiency point of view, this proliferation of the Court’s
workload is already far from ideal, and in this respect Säger’s mandatory re-
quirements concession has done (too) little to stem the flow. Arguably, Alpine
compounded matters by denying the existence of a ‘selling arrangements’ strat-
egy as undertaken in the free movement of goods. By contrast, it has been
argued that, focusing on the particular nature of services, the Keck distinction
would not fit anyway; as the ‘selling arrangements’ of a service form part of the
service itself, it would be unwise or unpractical to treat these separately.12 The
6. Case 120/78, Rewe Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, (Cassis de Dijon)
[1979] ECR 649.
7. Case C-76/90, Säger v. Dennemayer & Co. Ltd., [1991] ECR I-4221, para. 12: “[…] Article [49]
requires not only the elimination of all discrimination against a person providing services on the
ground of his nationality but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without
distinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member States, when it is
liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the activities of a provider of services established in
another Member State where he lawfully provides similar services.”
8. Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments BV v. Minister van Financiën, [1995] ECR I-1141.
9. Case C-275/92, Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise v. Schindler, [1994] ECR I-1039.
10. E.g. Case C-43/93, Raymond Vander Elst v. Office des Migrations Internationales, [1994], ECR I-
3803, para. 14; Case C-272/94, Guiot/Climatec, [1996] ECR I-1905 para. 10; Case C-222/95,
Société civile immobilière Parodi v. Banque H. Albert de Bary et Cie., [1997] ECR I-3899, para.
19; Joined Cases C-369 & 376/96, Criminal Proceedings against Arblade and Leloup [1999] ECR
I-8453, para. 33; Case C-58/98, Josef Corsten, [2000] ECR I-7919, para. 33.
11. Joined Cases C-267 & 268/91, Criminal Proceedings against Keck and Mithouard, [1993] ECR I-
6097.
12. See V. Hatzopoulos, Le principe communautaire d’équivalence et de reconnaissance mutuelle dans la
libre prestation de services (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1999), p. 254.
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consequence, in line then with Bosman,13 would be that ‘pure Keck’, the dis-
tinction between selling arrangements on the one hand, and other measures on
the other, operates in the field of goods only.14 Indeed, the Court repeated this
declinatory stance on the facts of De Agostini,15 though, as shall be argued, this
does not rule out that the right factual circumstances might still trigger its
effective application eventually.
Shunning the particularities of Keck and the specific realm in which it
matured for a moment, one cannot fail to notice the strikingly broad range
and purport of Säger’s abolition-behest. Taking the view that the Court thus
aligned its services case-law with the Dassonville16 stance, even if, admittedly,
the wide reach of the latter case never truly corresponded with the reality of
the goods case-law,17 a similar need, albeit twenty years on, to make the bite of
Article 49 less powerful than its bark, may prove to be equally as indispensable.
Moreover, as shall be expounded, a doctrine consisting in a conceptual but not
a typological kinsman of Keck, i.e. displaying its main similarity not in obviat-
ing the broadness of the earlier prohibition, but in mollifying the latter’s grasp
by enabling its preventive non-application,18 whether for some time already
dormant or not, truly seems on the verge of being nascent.19 There still might
not be a single grand theory – whether based on the concept of non-discrimi-
13. Case C-415/93, Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman,
Royal club liégeois SA v. Jean-Marc Bosman and others and Union des associations européennes de
football (UEFA) v. Jean-Marc Bosman, [1995] ECR I-4921
14. See Hatzopoulos, cited supra note 5, p. 68.
15. Joined Cases C-34/95, C-35/95, C-36/95, Konsumentenombudsmannen v. De Agostini (Svenska)
Förlag AB and Konsumentenombudsmannen v. TV-Shop, [1997] ECR I-3843.
16. Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, [1974] ECR 837.
17. See J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Constitution of the Common Market Place: Text and Context in the
Evolution of the Free Movement of Goods’, in P. Craig & G. de Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of
EU Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999, and S. Weatherill & P. Beaumont, EU Law,
London: Penguin 1999, p. 608.
18. For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that a general consensus in European legal
doctrine still does not exist on the question whether Keck truly disqualifies selling arrangements
as being equivalent to quantitative restrictions, thus bringing these outside the scope of Article 28
EC; or whether on the other hand, these should be regarded as measures equivalent to quantita-
tive restrictions, which are granted, though they are within the reach of Article 28 EC, through
Keck, an ‘internal exemption’ similar to the mandatory requirements doctrine. Cf. e.g. G. Davies,
‘Can Selling Arrangements Be Harmonised?’, (2005) 30 E.L.Rev., p. 376, and C. Barnard, The
Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 41.
19. To some, this will come as no surprise, as the ideas inspiring the Court on the free provision of
services have always seemed to resonate those behind the rules on the free movement of goods.
This can be gleaned especially from the trend of demanding the abolition of restricting, not just
discriminating, domestic measures. Also in the requirement that host States take heed of mea-
sures imposed by home States in protecting any relevant legitimate interests, the services case-law
closely follows that on goods. Compare e.g. Case 120/78, Rewe Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolver-
waltung für Branntwein, [1979] ECR 649, para. 14, and Case 272/80, Criminal Proceedings
against Biologische Producten BV, [1981] ECR 3277, para. 14.
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nation or in the principle of market access – generally accepted and capable of
explaining convincingly all the Court’s case-law on free movement, but many
writers do share the view that the Court’s case-law on the four freedoms is
steering a course for convergence.20 Thus, along with the continual spillover
from the ‘persons’ case law to that of goods, the multitude of intertwined
issues in goods and services, as exemplified by cases like De Agostini, would
make a fresh installment in their parallel evolution readily understandable.
Allegedly, Keck itself did little for legal certainty in the goods case-law; so
little that every possible new approach, as e.g. heralded in Gourmet,21 is greeted
with much enthusiasm. All the same, if Keck despite all criticisms22 is in se
never to be repealed, the emergence of a similar, rather than identical, doctrine
in the services case-law could still be forthcoming. As it is difficult to fit the
approach in the recent Viacom II and Mobistar cases, discussed below, in with
earlier jurisprudence, the main submission of this article is that the ECJ,
however unclear yet the direction, at least is backtracking on Säger, and may
well be steering for a new course. Therewith, as shall be illustrated, it poten-
tially has become possible to ascertain the theoretical framework underlying
the free movement provisions with greater accuracy than before.
2. Theories on Barriers: Taking Stock
What general test should apply to non-discriminatory barriers to services pro-
vision is a classic matter, and far from easily resolved. Although it is clear that
the Court in Säger parted with the traditional ‘discriminatory barriers-only’
approach, for now it is left to scholarship to deduce what type of test actually
replaced the discrimination framework. It is argued widely that it in fact was
substituted for a market access test, under which any rule that substantially
hinders the access of services to national markets would be caught by Article
49 EC and would, hence, have to be justified.23 The problem of correct
20. See e.g. Barnard (cited supra notes 5 and 18); R. Greaves, ‘Advertising Restrictions and the Free
Movement of Goods and Services’, (1998) 23 E.L.Rev., p. 305; W. Devroe & J. Wouters,
‘Liberté d’établissement et libre prestation des services’ (1996) J.T.D.E., p. 56; S. Weatherill,
‘After Keck: Some Thoughts on How to Clarify the Clarification’, (1996) 33 C.M.L.Rev., p.
885.
21. Case C-405/98, Konsumentombudsmannen v. Gourmet International Products, [2001] ECR I-
1795.
22. For all the enthusiasm with which the doctrine has initially been applied, uncertainties still
haunts the question of how a selling arrangement is to be defined. Also, it is at least regrettable
that the Court did not express itself on which cases Keck had exactly overturned. Finally, as
regards the actual flaws of the test and terms, see e.g. Weatherill, (cited supra note 20), passim,
and the opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-412/93 Société d’Importation Leclerc-Siplec v. TF1
Publicité and M6 Publicité, [1995] ECR I-179.
23. E.g. Weiler cited supra note 17; Barnard cited supra note 5; P. Oliver & W.-H. Roth, ‘The
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qualification of non-discriminatory barriers was, however, not settled defini-
tively by seeking recourse to this market access-doctrine. It remains ambiguous
why a national measure that would benefit from a Keck-type exemption ap-
plied under Article 49 EC, forecloses national markets to such an extent that
the matter would demand address under either Articles 46/55 EC, or the
mandatory requirements doctrine. Indeed, as emphasized by Da Cruz Vilaça,
conceptually it is incomprehensible why a rule prohibiting the sale of goods at
a loss would benefit from a specific exception, whereas a similar rule outlawing
sales of services at a loss would need to be subjected to a proportionality test.24
If the intention behind the provisions establishing the Internal Market actually
is to integrate national markets, rather than to liberalize trade by removing all
inhibitions to commerce (i.e. even those which do not obstruct imports and
exports), then one must conclude that national measures that affect equally,
both in law and in fact, the import of services, do not jeopardize the attain-
ment of that Market. What is then required in this respect is a case in which
the ECJ ascertains that this vision underlies the service regime as well.
Starting from the premise that goods and services share a common denomi-
nator, we will investigate below the possibility of a single theory underlying
both sets of rules, such as the idea that discrimination is not (or should not be)
the only issue in need of address, but market foreclosure too. Of course,
comparison with the free movement of goods case-law is apt, and occasionally,
neighbouring fields of law like the free movement of persons also will enter
into our analysis. All existing theories will be grouped into three main catego-
ries, the discrimination theory, the restrictions theory and the market access
theory respectively. A fourth category identified below consists of a combina-
tion of the first and the third. It will be argued that this fourth theory catches
all trade impairing measures that ‘ought’ to be caught under Article 49 EC.
The four theories are best seen as prisms: looking through them separately
sheds light on different aspects of trade barriers and the reason they are injuri-
ous to the Internal Market, but none of them provides a comprehensive solu-
tion individually.
2.1. The Discrimination Theory
It would appear contradictory to state that non-discriminatory barriers to trade
could be caught by an approach towards Article 49 EC that relies on a dis-
Internal Market and the Four Freedoms’, (2004) 41 C.M.L.Rev., p. 415–416; E. Spaventa,
‘From Gebhard to Carpenter: Towards a (Non-)economic European constitution’, (2004) 41
C.M.L.Rev., p. 756.
24. J.L. da Cruz Vilaça, ‘On the Application of Keck in the Field of Free Provision of Services’, in
M.T. Andenas & W.-H. Roth (eds.), Services and Free Movement in EU Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002), p. 39.
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crimination test. Nevertheless, the ECJ has in the past actually addressed such
barriers under such a test.25 Moreover, there are those who argue that many
more discriminatory scenarios could be caught under Article 49 EC by varying
the discrimination test, i.e. letting go of the nationality yardstick and looking
for other distinguishing criteria that should be disallowed.26 A ban on certain
(particularly effective) methods of marketing, for instance, would discriminate
to the detriment of foreign service providers who are trying to penetrate the
market of the regulating Member State. This theory may especially be of help
in the context of advertising restrictions, which were featured in a considerable
number of free movement of goods cases.27
A problem that may arise under a pure discrimination test under Article 49
EC is that straightforward bans on selling certain products normally affect
nationally produced services as severely as imported ones; it would nevertheless
appear to be peculiar to turn a blind eye to them.28 If subjected to a Keck-like
rule, such bans might escape the prohibition of Article 49 EC, while this sort
of measure obviously interferes with the establishment of the Internal Market;
they undoubtedly form a barrier to enter a national market.29 The ECJ made
no mistake when it held this type of rule to fall inside the scope of Article 49
EC; its wording is indeed broad enough to catch total prohibitions.30 The
reason that their inclusion appears to be correct is that it is difficult to appre-
25. Respectively Case 33/73, J.H.M. van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de
Metaalnijverheid, [1974] ECR 1299; Case 71/7, Jean Thieffry v. Conseil de l’ordre des avocats à la
cour de Paris, [1977] ECR 765.
26. W.-H. Roth, ‘The European Court of Justice’s Case Law on Freedom to Provide Services: Is
Keck Relevant?’ in M.T. Andenas & W.-H. Roth (eds.), Services and Free Movement in EU Law
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 13.
27. E.g. Case C-320/93, Lucien Ortscheit GmbH v. Eurim-Pharm Arzneimittel GmbH, [1994] ECR
I-5243; Case C-412/93 Société d’Importation Leclerc-Siplec v. TF1 Publicité and M6 Publicité,
[1995] ECR I-179; Case C-6/98 Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Rundfunkanstalten (ARD) v. Pro
Sieben Media AG, supported by SAT 1 Satellitenfernsehen GmbH, Kabel 1, K 1 Fernsehen GmbH,
[1999] ECR I-7599.
28. Nevertheless, in its early case law, the ECJ left this type of measure untouched: Case 52/79,
Procureur du Roi v. Marc J.V.C. Debauve and others, [1980] ECR 833. Cf. P. Oliver, W.-H.
Roth, cited supra note 23, p. 415.
29. Under Article 28 EC an outright ban qualifies as a quantitative restriction (Case 34/79, R. v.
Maurice Donald Henn and John Frederick Ernest Darby, [1979] ECR 3795). Article 49 EC does
not mention this specific type of barrier but employs the broader notion of ‘restrictions’. See also
Spaventa, cited supra note 23, p. 761.
30. Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments BV v. Minister van Financiën, [1995] ECR I-1141; Case C-
275/92, Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise v. Schindler, [1994] ECR I-1039; Case C-67/98
Questore di Verona v. Diego Zenatti, [1999] ECR I-7289. The exact grounds for disallowing
outright bans to service provision are unclear; however Spaventa, cited supra note 23, p. 761: ‘A
total barrier to imports runs against the very prohibition on quantitative restrictions contained in
the Treaty. […] But also, and more importantly, both a ban on imports and a ban on the
provision of services run against the mutual recognition principle.’
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ciate why a product (be it a service or a good) that is lawfully marketed in one
state should be banned in another, even though the principle of mutual recog-
nition does not apply to goods to exactly the same extent as it applies to
services.
A closely related complication arises out of another dissimilarity between
the regimes of the provisions on goods on one hand and services on the other;
it is caused by the quadripartite approach of the goods regime, which consists
of four separate provisions, Articles 25, 28, 29 and 90 EC, covering a wide
variety of intra-Community trade barriers. These are not individually specified
in Article 49 EC, which will therefore have to address all types of restrictions
if it intends to have the same scope as the entire regime applicable to goods. It
is clear from Alpine that Article 49 EC also covers export restrictions.31 Never-
theless, there is a marked difference between Articles 28 and 29 EC: whereas
the scope of Article 28 EC embraces both directly and indirectly discrimina-
tory measures, the realm of Article 29 EC only stretches to cover directly
discriminatory rules.32 Should the same distinction be read into Article 49 EC,
despite its broader formulation?33 It is submitted here that it should.
One interesting aspect of the discrimination theory is the way in which
certain national measures that are prima facie candidates for the Keck-rule,
mainly those rules that prohibit certain types of advertising or other marketing
methods, would be dealt with. One could argue that restrictions on the use of
certain ways of advertising or other types of product promotion discriminate
between, on the one hand, products already on the market of the Member
State that called the restriction into being, and, on the other, products from
other Member States which still have to find their way to the Member State
where the restrictive marketing regime is in force. On this point we agree with
Roth, however, that even restrictions on advertising that stem from national
rules, which are actually in harmony with one another, may hinder intra-
Community trade.34 Such is to say that, even if two Member States happened
to have enacted advertising restrictions of a similar nature, their respective
national traders may find it difficult to penetrate the other Member State’s
national market if they are not allowed to use certain particularly effective
31. If Article 49 EC also applies to export restrictions by reason of its broader formulation, one
could argue by analogy that it would also apply to financial barriers like the ones encompassed
by Articles 25 and 90 EC. Such financial burdens without doubt would qualify as ‘restrictions’.
32. Case 15/79, P.B. Groenveld BV v. Produktschap voor vee en vlees, [1979] ECR 3409; Case 155/
80, Criminal proceedings against Sergius Oebel, [1981] ECR 1993; Case C-80/92, Commission v.
Belgium, [1994] ECR I-1019.
33. Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments BV v. Minister van Financiën, [1995] ECR I-1141, paras 40–
48: in essence, the Dutch prohibition on ‘cold calling’ formed a restraint on exports more than
on national sales.
34. W.-H. Roth, ‘Combined case-note on Keck and Mithouard and Hünermund’, (1994) 31
C.M.L.Rev., p. 854.
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means of marketing. Under a pure discrimination test, it appears impossible to
solve this problem.
This example is a species of another obstacle that is difficult to capture
under a pure discrimination test, a double regulatory barrier. Although one
might argue that services subjected to regulation from their home state (the
state of origin) are discriminated against because, once exported, they also have
to satisfy the requirements set by the host state (the state of destination), it is
far from clear how this would qualify as discriminatory. Here, the premise
could be that services meant for export would suffer discriminatory treatment
as they have to pass two tests, whereas nationally traded products only have to
be in conformity with one set of rules.35 It is, however, extremely difficult to
perceive how Member States would be able to avoid this type of discrimina-
tion.36 The only option here is to take foreign law into account when regulat-
ing trade in services, which is not a particularly attractive option in a Union of
twenty-five (and beyond) Member States.
2.2. The Restrictions Theory
A second way of analyzing what type of trade barrier, by some standard, ought
to fall foul of Article 49 EC is assessing whether the national rule contains a
restriction to trade. There are judgments regarding the free movement of
persons37 that employ this theory, but overall it has not been hailed with great
enthusiasm.38 Small wonder, since the restrictions theory knows many pitfalls,
caused by its very general nature. Under such a theory, Member States should
remove all ‘obstacles’ to trade. First of all, the notion of ‘obstacles’ is rather
vague, as has rightly been pointed out by Barnard in a comment on Carpen-
ter:39
‘Take Carpenter as an example: what was the obstacle which ‘deterred’
Mr Carpenter from exercising his freedom to provide cross-border ser-
vices – the separation of husband and wife which would be ‘detrimental
to their family life’, the potential loss of child care, or the emotional
distress involved?’40
35. Roth, cited supra note 27, p. 13 (footnote 59).
36. Ibid., footnote 60.
37. Case C-415/93, Union royale belge des sociétés de football association ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman,
Royal club liégeois SA v. Jean-Marc Bosman and others and Union des associations européennes de
football (UEFA) v. Jean-Marc Bosman, [1995] ECR I-4921; Case C-19/92, Dieter Kraus v. Land
Baden-Württemberg, [1993] ECR I-1663; Case C-60/00, Mary Carpenter v. Secretary of State for
the Home Department, [2002] ECR I-6279.
38. Barnard, cited supra note 18, p. 260.
39. Case C-60/00, Mary Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2002] ECR I-
6279.
40. Barnard, cited supra note 18, p. 260 (footnotes omitted).
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Indeed, it appears that ‘obstacles’ contains a subjective element, which could
be formulated as the question: ‘Does the service provider feel that a national
measure curtails his freedom to provide services in any significant way?’ Ad-
mittedly, in the context of service provision, the notion could be objectified to
a greater extent, as it may have to be addressed in relation to the service itself
and not in relation to the service provider. Nevertheless, the subjective element
comes into play again when the service provider himself is hindered in his
freedom to move to another Member State in order to perform his services
there.
A related aspect is the almost embedded need for a de minimis demarcation
line. If, indeed, all measures that have some restrictive impact on the free
movement of services should be drawn into the scope of Article 49 EC, one
might argue that, in mitigation, these barriers will have to produce a noticeable
impact on economic life. In the context of Article 28 EC, this discussion has
already taken place. Advocate General Van Gerven proposed to introduce a
type of de minimis test in Torfaen,41 but the ECJ rejected his submission. Later
on, Advocate General Lenz refocused the debate by arguing that the emphasis
should be on market access instead of on the substantiality of the restraint.42
Nevertheless, the substantiality criterion re-entered through the backdoor,
when Advocate General Jacobs argued in turn that if unlimited access to
national markets was the proper criterion by which national measures should
be judged, any non-discriminatory measure that exerts a substantial restriction
to access to another Member State should be caught by Article 28 EC.43 The
word ‘substantial’ appears to suggest that negligible barriers may also exist, and
that the borderline between these categories would logically be formed by a de
minimis test of some kind.44 In this respect, the restrictions theory and the
market access theory, discussed below, appear to overlap. A potential impedi-
ment that does not appear to restrict trade in any noticeable way would prob-
ably not bar access to a national market either.
Lastly, pleading against this theory as the sole dominating paradigm, it
cannot be held that the EC Treaty intends to prohibit every barrier to trade. It
aims at eliminating barriers to interstate trade only. This becomes apparent
from the fact that purely internal situations still do not come under the scope
of the free movement provisions, even though the transnational elements are
41. See the opinion of AG Van Gerven in Case 145/88, Torfaen Borough Council v. B & Q Plc.,
[1989] ECR 3851.
42. See the opinion of AG Lenz in Case C-391/92, Commission v. Greece, [1995] ECR I-1621.
43. See the opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-412/93 Société d’Importation Leclerc-Siplec v. TF1
Publicité and M6 Publicité, [1995] ECR I-179. See also: G. Straetmans, ‘Case-note on Gourmet’,
(2002) 39 C.M.L.Rev., p. 1412–1413. See also the opinion of AG Tesauro in Case C-292/92
Ruth Hünermund and others v. Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Württemberg, [1993] ECR I-6787.
44. K. Mortelmans, ‘Towards convergence in the application of the rules on free movement and on
competition?’ (2001) 38 C.M.L.Rev., p. 633–634.
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increasingly marginalized by the ECJ in recent cases.45 Judgments predomi-
nantly based on the restriction theory are often controversial because of the
rather vague notion of ‘restrictions’, which give a catch-all character to the
Treaty provisions safeguarding free movement. This is unavoidable, as laws are
an exponent of government involvement in private life and, surely, any gov-
ernment interference in civil liberties in some way will curtail private (eco-
nomic) freedom and thereby produce obstacles to trade.46 Nonetheless, Judge
Joliet rightly argued that it is was not the intention of those who designed the
Treaty to liberalize trade in general, by attacking any type of public involve-
ment in economic life. It rather was to integrate segregated national markets.47
A theory exclusively based on the question of whether a national trading rule
impairs economic freedom thus would be over-inclusive, and would shift the
emphasis towards justification of such measures under express derogation
clauses or the rule of reason. For these reasons, it is submitted that the restric-
tions theory never should be applied in isolation, but may fulfil a useful
ancillary role when applied in combination with the traditional discrimination
model. For instance, it can be of use in determining whether the effects of a
national measure have the same repercussions on national and foreign traders.
2.3. The Market Access Theory
It has been argued that the third theory which may underlie the free move-
ment rules, the market access theory, is in reality an extension of the ‘factual
equality test’ introduced in Keck.48 One may recall that the ECJ held that
national rules that ‘[…] affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the
marketing of domestic products and of those from other Member States […]’
fall outside the realm of Article 28 EC. De Agostini showed that foreign prod-
ucts are placed at a disadvantage in case a non-discriminatory rule factually
45. See Hatzopoulos, cited supra note 5, p. 58–62, and e.g. in the free movement of goods Case C-
72/03, Carbonati Apuani Srl v. Comune di Carrara, [2004] ECR I-8027; Case C-293/02, Jersey
Produce Marketing Organisation Ltd v. States of Jersey and Jersey Potato Export Marketing Board,
n.y.r.
46. Cf. R. Barents, ‘Measures of Equivalent Effect. Some Recent Developments’, (1981) 18
C.M.L.Rev., p. 287: ‘State interventions on the market may be said to have an appreciable effect
by their very nature.’
47. R. Joliet, ‘La libre circulation des marchandises: l’arrêt Keck et Mithouard et les nouvelles
orientations de la jurisprudence’, Exposé présenté lors de la visite des Cours suprêmes à la Cour de
justice le 6 juin 1994. See also the opening sentence from the opinion of AG Tesauro in Case C-
292/92, Ruth Hünermund and others v. Landesapothekerkammer Baden-Württemberg, [1993] ECR
I-6787: ‘Is Article 30 of the Treaty a provision intended to liberalise intra-Community trade or
is it intended more generally to encourage the unhindered pursuit of commerce in individual
Member States?’
48. Straetmans, cited supra note 43, p. 1414.
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hampers their access to a national market. Especially when the national mea-
sure outlaws a specific type of advertising, it has the inherent effect of blocking
access, thereby making life harder for the foreign trader than for the nationally
oriented businessman. After all, the effect of such a ban would be that manu-
facturers in other Member States ‘[…] would find it virtually impossible to
penetrate the market in which the ban was imposed’.49 The national produc-
ers, already present in their home market, naturally would not suffer the same
distress.
The Gourmet judgment helped to carve details into the rule laid down in
Keck, by specifying which national legal instruments would be classified as
selling arrangements. Apparently, national rules that form some impediment
to the use of effective marketing means (such as certain types of advertising) do
not factually affect national and foreign traders equally, and will therefore not
escape the scrutiny of Article 28 EC. In fact, one could even see this as an
abandonment of the dichotomy introduced by Keck, i.e. that a national mea-
sure must either qualify as a selling arrangement or as a product requirement.50
It seems a better question to ask instead whether the national measure ob-
structs access to the market; product requirements usually do, but selling ar-
rangements, especially advertising restrictions, may produce similar effects.
In this context, the close link between the goods and services case-law is
provided by Alpine Investments.51 It appears from this case that the ECJ does
not wish to introduce a hard and fast Keck-like rule under Article 49 EC, only
to find that it will subsequently need to refine it, just as it had to (and has)
refined Keck in many subsequent cases.52 The ECJ seems to have been treading
on this path, disregarding a Keck dichotomy under Article 49 EC, when it
ruled that the Dutch ban on cold-calling ‘[…] directly affects access to the
markets in services in the other Member States and is thus capable of hinder-
ing intra-Community trade in services’.53 Ever since, the waiting has been for
49. Opinion of AG Jacobs in Joined Cases C-34/95, C-35/95, C-36/95, Konsumentenombudsmannen
v. De Agostini (Svenska) Förlag AB and Konsumentenombudsmannen v. TV-Shop, [1997] ECR I-
3843, para. 99.
50. Straetmans, cited supra note 43, p. 1414.
51. Noteworthy is that in the free movement of goods case Heimdienst, the ECJ addressed the
notion of trade impediment with explicit reference to Alpine Investments, a free movement of
services case; Case C-254/98, Schutzverband gegen unlauteren Wettbewerb v. TK-Heimdienst Sass
GmbH, [2000] ECR I-151, para. 29.
52. For a recent overview of the post-Keck case-law, see K.J.M. Mortelmans, ‘De Keck-check’,
(2005), 11/12 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht, p. 247.
53. Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments BV v. Minister van Financiën, [1995] ECR I-1141, para. 38.
See also: M. Poiares Maduro, ‘Hamony and Dissonance in Free Movement’, in M.T. Andenas &
W.-H. Roth (eds.), Services and Free Movement in EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002), 41, p. 62. On different types of market access theories, see C. Barnard & S. Deakin,
‘Market access and regulatory competition,’ in C. Barnard and J. Scott (eds.), The Law of the
Single European Market. Unpacking the Premises, (Oxford: Hart, 2002), p. 204–213. Some
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a case to come up in which the effects of the national rule were not so as to
preclude access to a national market, i.e. a services case in which Keck, or,
rather, the more fundamental theory Keck appears to be a symptom of, is
applied under Article 49 EC.
2.4. The Combination Theory: Discrimination and Market Access
It is possible to combine the discrimination and market access theories into
one paradigm, in which the traditional discrimination theory forms the initial
framework for case analysis, and the market access theory fulfils an ancillary
role.54 The ECJ expressly mentioned this possibility in a case concerning the
freedom of establishment, Commission v. Belgium. The Court there held that
‘[t]he conditions laid down for the registration of aircraft must therefore not
discriminate on grounds of nationality or form an obstacle to the exercise of
that freedom’.55 This phrasing seems to suggest that a two-tiered approach will
be taken by the ECJ: if a discriminatory intent or effect of the national mea-
sure can be discerned, the Court may condemn the national law on that basis
alone. If, however, no sign of direct or indirect discrimination emanates from
the first assessment, the ECJ will proceed to look whether an obstacle to the
exercise of the relevant fundamental freedom can be found.56 The combina-
tion theory thus may tie the discrimination and market access theories to-
gether. It finds it origin in Keck, notably in paragraph 16 of the judgment,
where the ECJ held that as long as national provisions apply equally to domes-
tic and foreign traders and as long as they affect both parties equally both in
law and in fact, they do not qualify as barriers in the sense of Dassonville.57
The best examples of measures with trade-impairing factual effects are the
Swedish advertising prohibitions De Agostini and Gourmet revolved around,
respectively a ban on television advertising directed at children under the age
of twelve, and a ban on certain methods of advertising for alcoholic beverages.
authors believe, however, that the application of the Keck-doctrine to services was explicitly
rejected in Alpine: L. Idot, Europe (1995), Juillet Comm. No. 264, p. 11.
54. See Roth, cited supra note 27, p. 16; Barnard, cited supra note 18, p. 261.
55. Case C-203/98, Commission v. Belgium, [1999] ECR I-4899, para. 12 (emphasis added).
56. Due care should be taken in drawing too much inference from the passage above: it must be
stressed that in the original French version of the judgment, the word ‘ni’ is used instead of ‘or’,
while in the German and Dutch the words ‘und’ respectively ‘en’ are used, both meaning ‘and’.
Consequently, in the English version, the test appears to consist of two stages; if the national
measure does not pass the scrutiny of the first stage, there appears to be no room for assessment
under the second stage, whereas in the French, Dutch and German versions, the stages seem to
be plainly cumulative rather than arranged in any specific order.
57. Joined Cases C-267 & 268/91, Criminal Proceedings against Keck and Mithouard, [1993] ECR I-
6097, para. 16 (emphasis added).
A Retreat from Säger?
219
Under the traditional discrimination theory, these outright prohibitions would
have affected in the same manner, in law and in fact, national and imported
goods as the prohibition impairs their marketing in exactly the same fashion.
Nevertheless, the ECJ stretched the meaning of the notion ‘affecting in fact’ in
Gourmet by stating:
‘[…] the Court is able to conclude that, in the case of products like
alcoholic beverages, the consumption of which is linked to traditional
social practices and to local habits and customs, a prohibition of all
advertising directed at consumers […] is liable to impede access to the
market by products from other Member States more than it impedes
access by domestic products, with which consumers are instantly more
familiar.’58
On the basis of this paragraph, the factual setting in which the detrimental
consequences for imports caused by a national measure should be broadened
beyond a mere analysis of the effects the trade barrier is likely to propel itself;
i.e. it should be judged against the relevant factual background, not in the
abstract. It seems that under the traditional discrimination approach, the con-
text in which assessment of the obstruction took place was confined to such an
assessment in abstracto. When, however, the surrounding and more remotely
related facts are also taken into account, one may reach a different conclusion.
That appears to be exactly what the ECJ did in Gourmet. The relevant facts
that ought to be taken into account apparently include that Sweden had only
recently joined the EU when the judgment was passed; its market for alcoholic
drinks had been foreclosed to a very high degree by its system of compulsory
sales through a government-controlled distribution chain,59 and a genuine risk
was present that the market would not open up if foreign traders remained
unable to promote their products. It could well be that if not Sweden but a
different Member State, which had already been part of the EC for a much
longer period, had called into life a similar prohibition, market access would
not have been obstructed as significantly as was the case in Gourmet.60 This is
why national measures curbing companies’ freedom to advertise are tricky
examples of ‘selling arrangements’. It is likewise the reason why the intent to
impair trade on part of the legislator should not play a role when its laws are
58. Case C-405/98, Konsumentombudsmannen v. Gourmet International Products, [2001] ECR I-
1795, para. 21.
59. See Case C-189/95, Criminal proceedings against Harry Franzén, [1997] ECR I-5909.
60. Besides, there is a more general risk for foreign traders that national operators do not run: it is
difficult for exporters to ship their goods ‘à la bonne foi’ to another Member State and only
hope and pray they will subsequently be sold. An advertising campaign can be seen as a first step
towards entering a national market.
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scrutinized; it is the factual effect assessed in the factual context in which the rule
is applied that counts.61
3. Keck in the Land of Services – Opportunities So Far
In view of this last remark, it makes sense to explore if there is room for the
application of the Keck rule under article 49 EC, or, rather, it would appear
sensible to look whether the proper factual setting in which this rule would
apply has ever presented itself. We submit that it has not. In our view, the ECJ
has had two opportunities to introduce the Keck exception in the field of
service provision, in Alpine Investments and in De Agostini. On closer inspec-
tion, conducted below, it appears neither case lends itself for this purpose.62
Unsurprising, one could say, as both cases deal with restrictions to the use of
certain marketing methods.
3.1. Alpine Investments
In Alpine Investments, as mentioned above, the ECJ addressed the Dutch ban
on unsolicited phone calls to consumers in order to market financial products.
As the prohibition applied to phone calls to potential customers established in
the Netherlands as well as in other Members States, the measure could be
qualified as non-discriminatory. The Dutch and UK governments subse-
quently contended that this was the reason it should benefit from the Keck
exemption, applied analogously under Article 49 EC. The Court, however,
distinguished that case on the facts by holding that ‘[s]uch a prohibition is not
analogous to the legislation concerning selling arrangements held in Keck and
Mithouard to fall outside the scope of Article 30 of the Treaty’.63 This state-
ment can be seen as a silent acceptance of the Keck exemption and its trans-
plantation into Article 49 EC.64 However, it is equally plausible that the ECJ
just ignored the applicability of an exception for selling arrangements from the
scope of that provision.65 The fact that it went to the trouble of rebutting the
Dutch and UK’s contention, however, seems to indicate that it had accepted,
be it in obiter, the potential applicability of Keck under Art. 49 EC. However,
the Court hastily responded to the submissions of the Netherlands and the UK
by holding that the prohibition at stake ‘[…] directly affects access to the
61. Roth, cited supra note 27, p. 11; Oliver & Roth, cited supra note 23, p. 416.
62. Da Cruz Vilaça, cited supra note 24, p. 28–30.
63. Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments BV v. Minister van Financiën, [1995] ECR I-1141, para. 36.
64. M. Poiares Maduro, ‘The Saga of Article 30 EC: To Be Continued’, (1998) 5 Maastricht
Journal, p. 315.
65. V. Hatzopoulos, ‘Case-note on Alpine Investments,’ (1995) 32 C.M.L.Rev., p. 1427.
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market in services in the other Member States and is thus capable of hindering
intra-Community trade in services’.66
This leap from considerations relating to the applicability of Keck to the
classification of the Dutch rule as a barrier to service provision spurred some
authors to conclude that the ECJ actually rejected the applicability of the Keck-
rule under Article 49 EC.67 That observation may be true, but considering the
rather neutral wording employed by the Court, it is no less likely that it was
trying to kill several birds with one stone. One could contend that the Court
restated Keck by laying more stress on the second condition,68 i.e. by empha-
sizing that an indistinctly applicable national measure can form an obstacle to
trade when the effects it produces impose heavier on foreign traders than on
national ones.69 A third way of looking at Alpine Investments is that Keck is
actually ignored by the Court in its assessment of the case. This view is sup-
ported by the sharp contrast in approach with Leclerc-Siplec, a free movement
of goods case in which Keck was successfully invoked.70 In that case, a French
law precluded companies active in the distribution sector from making use of
television advertising. The ECJ appeared very keen to qualify the French law
as a selling arrangement by referring to the fact that distributors have alterna-
tive means of advertising at their disposal. The Court’s implicit refusal to take
that same argument into account in Alpine Investments (it did not assess
whether any effective marketing methods besides cold calling were available)
could be regarded as an expression of its unwillingness to apply Keck to service
cases.71 This could also be explained by the fact that Alpine Investments more
closely resembles what would be an Article 29 EC case, had it concerned
goods. To the present authors, this seems the most plausible reason why Keck
was not successfully applied in Alpine.72
66. Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments BV v. Minister van Financiën, [1995] ECR I-1141, para. 38.
67. E.g. J.-G. Huglo, ‘Liberté d’établissement et libre prestation des services’, (1995) R.T.D.E., p.
827, in whose opinion the Court excluded in Alpine “[…] toute pollution de la matière de la
libre prestation des services par la jurisprudence Keck et Mithouard […]”; see also Idot, cited
supra note 53; Hatzopoulos, cited supra note 65.
68. The first condition being that the national measure should only regulate selling arrangements
rather than be aimed at regulating the flux of goods between Member States. It is submitted that
the ECJ no longer pays much attention to the first criterion: see Poiares Maduro, cited supra
note 64, p. 54–55.
69. Similarly Hatzopoulos, cited supra note 65, p. 1438.
70. Ibid., p. 1439.
71. J. Stuyck, ‘Case-note on De Agostini’, (1997) 34 C.M.L.Rev., p. 1466. Of further relevance is
also the order in which the ECJ deals with qualifying the restriction at hand: it first performs a
classic, pre-Keck examination of the case, only to address Keck after the conclusion that the
Dutch measure can be seen as a barrier has already been drawn.
72. For the same reasons it appears not to have been applicable in Pro Sieben either: Case C-6/98,
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Rundfunkanstalten (ARD) v. PRO Sieben Media AG, supported by
SAT1 Satellitenfernsehen GmbH, Kabel 1, K1 Fernsehen GmbH, [1999] ECR I-7599, paras. 49–
52.
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3.2. De Agostini
A second opportunity to transplant the Keck-doctrine to Article 49 EC pre-
sented itself when De Agostini was referred to the ECJ. The Swedish legislation
which was impugned in this case forbade, amongst many other things, the
marketing of products through television commercials specifically aimed at
children under the age of twelve. Although this case too was resolved largely
under Article 28 EC as De Agostini tried to market magazines, it also touched
upon the free movement of services. Although the magazines which were at
stake qualified as goods and therefore fell under the scope of Article 28 EC,
the re-transmission of television commercials obviously was a service to be
placed within the ambit of Article 49 EC. In so far as the Swedish legislation
inhibited the sale of magazines, it could, according to the Court, be qualified
as a selling arrangement, but not if it were proven before the national court
that ‘[…] the ban does not affect in the same way, in fact and in law, the
marketing of national products and of products from other Member States’.
When turning to the second question referred by the Swedish Court, the ECJ
takes a different perspective:
‘Provisions such as those in question in the main proceedings, where they
restrict the possibility for television broadcasters established in the broad-
casting State to broadcast, for advertisers established in the receiving
State, television advertising specifically directed at the public in the re-
ceiving State, involve a restriction on freedom to provide services.’73
At first glance, these differing approaches towards the same trade barrier ap-
pear contradictory. If they are examined in light of a remark of Advocate
General Jacobs in his opinion in Leclerc-Siplec, however, they need not be. He
felt that the restrictiveness of a national measure depends, amongst other fac-
tors, upon the availability of alternatives for the party facing the trade bar-
rier.74 Indeed, the advertiser, De Agostini, had other, maybe less effective,
means of advertising than television commercials at its disposal, such as adver-
tisements in magazines, billboards, or perhaps door-to-door folders. The ECJ
addressed the same matter under Article 49 EC not from the advertiser’s
stance, but from the perspective of the broadcaster.75 Whereas the advertiser
can change its marketing policy, the broadcaster cannot change the contents of
73. Joined Cases C-34/95, C-35/95, C-36/95, Konsumentenombudsmannen v. De Agostini (Svenska)
Förlag AB and Konsumentenombudsmannen v. TV-Shop, [1997] ECR I-3843, para. 50.
74. Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-412/93 Société d’Importation Leclerc-Siplec v. TF1 Publicité and
M6 Publicité, [1995] ECR I-179, para. 45.
75. Stuyck, cited supra note 71, p. 1467. This is subscribed to by Da Cruz Vilaça, cited supra note
24, p. 32–33.
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the television commercial offered to him in order to be de-transmitted, and is
therefore faced with what to him is an outright ban,76 while this may be a
restraint of relatively minor importance to a different party within the chain of
product distribution or presentation.77 But perhaps the time is near when the
ECJ can no longer distinguish cases on the facts, and will have to examine
whether the Keck-doctrine may in some form find harbour under Article 49
EC too.
4. Barriers, Keck and the Land of Services – A Novel Approach?
Two recent cases give rise to the suspicion that the above cases truly are, in a
sense, merely missed opportunities, and not principled denials, though the
wait for an overt application of Keck itself is at present still not over. A greater
synthesis of approaches seems nigh however, with which, as said, it could very
well prove possible to outline the conceptual framework that underlies the free
movement provisions with greater accuracy than ever before.
4.1. Viacom II
This case,78 decided in February 2005, arose out of a dispute between the
undertakings Viacom Outdoor, established in Italy, and Giotto Immobilier,
established in France.79 Viacom demanded payment from Giotto for bill-
posting advertising services provided in 2000 in the municipality of Genoa,
Italy. Contested between the parties was only the part of the sum which served
as reimbursement for the expenditure on the municipal advertising tax, which
was payable to the municipality of Genoa. Giotto refused to reimburse Viacom
for this expenditure, claiming the municipal tax contravened Community law.
The called-on national court subsequently referred questions to the ECJ on the
possible infringement of Articles 86, 82, 87 and 88 EC. After terse investiga-
tion, the Court deemed these questions to be inadmissible, as the order for
reference did not provide the information necessary to give a meaningful reply
to the questions referred. However, the question also referred, of whether the
municipal advertising tax constituted an impediment to the freedom to pro-
vide services, contrary to Article 49 EC, could be answered. The Court first
76. Which qualifies as a restriction; Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-412/93 Société d’Importation
Leclerc-Siplec v. TF1 Publicité and M6 Publicité, [1995] ECR I-179, para. 44.
77. Da Cruz Vilaça, cited supra note 24, p. 33.
78. Case C-134/03, Viacom Outdoor SrL v. Giotto Immobilier SARL, [2005] n.y.r.
79. In the first Viacom case (C-190/02, [2002] ECR I-8287), the ECJ found the reference for a
preliminary ruling to be manifestly inadmissible, as the latter did not provide sufficient explana-
tion of the factual and legislative context.
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reiterated the stance familiar ever since the Säger case, and emphasized that
Article 49 EC ‘requires the elimination of any restriction to the freedom to
provide services, even if it applies to national providers of services and to those
of other Member States alike, when it is liable to prohibit or otherwise impede
the activities of a provider of services established in another Member State
where he lawfully provides similar services’.80 As the Court has asserted before
that national tax measures restricting the free provision of services may indeed
be considered contrary to Article 49 EC,81 what remained was to scrutinize the
Italian advertising tax in particular. The Court noted that it is levied without
distinction, regardless of the place of establishment of the provider or recipient
of the bill-posting services, or the place of origin of the advertised goods or
services:
‘Next, such a tax is applied only to outdoor activities involving the use of
public space administered by the municipal authorities, and its amount is
fixed at a level which may be considered modest in relation to the value
of the services provided which are subject to it. In those circumstances,
the levying of such a tax is not on any view liable to prohibit, impede or
otherwise make less attractive the provision of advertising services to be
carried out in the territory of the municipalities concerned, including the
case in which the provision of services is of a cross-border nature on
account of the place of establishment of either the provider or the recipi-
ent of the services.’82
The advertising tax was therefore judged to be compatible with Article 49 EC.
This outcome is striking, as on a strict reading of Säger, which the Court
formally still adheres to, the Italian rules would have been outlawed by Com-
munity law. The municipal tax was imposed on inter alia bill-posting services
of a cross-border nature on the basis of the place of establishment of either the
provider or the recipient of the services, and in this respect constituted a
restriction, though any restrictions are to be abolished. The fact that it con-
cerned an indistinctly applicable measure, moreover that it concerned only a
marginal sum, was, apparently, de facto sufficient to take the case outside the
scope of the prohibition. Evidently, this amounts to backtracking on the Säger
imperative. It also puts dents in any attempts to infer a pure restrictions theory
80. Para. 35 (emphasis added), with reference to Case C-262/02, Commission v. France, [2004] ECR
I-6569, para. 22, and Case C-429/02, Bacardi France SAS, formerly Bacardi-Martini SAS v.
Télévision française 1 SA (TF1), Groupe Jean-Claude Darmon SA and Girosport SARL, [2004]
ECR I-6613, para. 31. Both paragraphs cited explicitly refer back to Säger, para. 12.
81. See Case C-17/00, François De Coster v. Collège des bourgmestre et échevins de Watermael-Boitsfort
[2001] ECR I-9445, esp. para. 29.
82. Para. 38 (emphasis added).
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underlying (at least this section of) the free movement case-law. Finally, a
proportionality or rather a de minimis of sorts as regards cross-border market
access seems to be in order, whose exact standards test have yet to be developed
on a case-by-case basis. Still, Viacom leaves a sizeable question mark as regards
its wider significance and possible structural ramifications.
4.2. Mobistar
In search for further clarification, a link may potentially be established with
Mobistar.83 In these joined cases, decided in September 2005, two companies,
Mobistar and Belgacom Mobile, contested the legality of the adoption of two
separate Belgian municipal regulations that concerned the taxation of their
mobile telecommunications infrastructure. One of the questions referred to
the ECJ sought to ascertain whether Article 49 EC precluded the introduction,
whether by legislation of national or local authorities, of such taxation.84 The
Court reiterated its position from De Coster that the measures of the kind in
dispute could in principle constitute a prohibited measure. Next, it empha-
sized again that vested case-law demands the abolition of any restriction, even
if it were to apply without distinction, liable to prohibit or further impede the
activities of a service provider established in another Member State where he
provides similar services.85 National rules that have the effect of making the
provision of services between Member States more difficult than the provision
of services purely within one Member State have also been expressly prohibited
before.86 However:
‘[…] measures, the only effect of which is to create additional costs in
respect of the service in question and which affect in the same way the
provision of services between Member States and that within one Mem-
ber State, do not fall within the scope of Article [49] of the Treaty. As
regards the question whether the levy […] in question in the main pro-
ceedings amounts to a restriction incompatible with Article [49] EC, it is
necessary to point out that such taxes apply without distinction to all
83. Joined Cases C-544/03 and C-545/03, Mobistar NV v. Commune de Fléron and Belgacom Mobile
NV v. Gemeente Schaarbeek, [2005] n.y.r.
84. The second question, discussion of which would go beyond the scope of our inquiry, pertained
to the correct interpretation and exact ambit of Article 3c of Commission Directive 90/388/EEC
on competition in the markets for telecommunication services.
85. Para. 29, with reference to Case C-43/93, Raymond Vander Elst v. Office des Migrations
Internationales, [1994], ECR I-3803, para. 14, and Case C-17/00, François De Coster v. Collège
des bourgmestre et échevins de Watermael-Boitsfort [2001] ECR I-9445, para. 29. Again, these
both paragraphs explicitly refer back to Säger’s para. 12.
86. See e.g. Case C-118/96, Jessica Safir v. Skattemyndigheten i Dalarnas Län, formerly Skattemyn-
digheten i Kopparbergs Län, [1998] ECR I-1897, para. 23.
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owners of mobile telephone installations within the commune in ques-
tion, and that foreign operators are not, either in law or in fact, more
adversely affected by those measures than national operators.’87
The levies in question applied without distinction. Foreign operators were
neither in law or in fact affected any more by the measures than national
operators, nor was the provision of cross-border services rendered more diffi-
cult than national service provision.88 Article 49 EC was therefore to be con-
sidered as not precluding the disputed measures, provided they met the condi-
tions of first, applying without distinction to both national service providers
and those established in other Member States, and second, affecting both of
these in the same way, in law and in fact. Thus, in Mobistar, the factual
equality test launched in Keck is also brought to the fore in the free movement
of services. The market access theory, and therewith also in particular the
combination theory expounded above, resonates clearly in this case. Again, the
purport of Säger appears to have diminished to a considerable extent. More-
over, the two conditions submitted by the Court render it quite likely that a
more general inference can be drawn here. Clearly, the Keck doctrine in itself
is not being transplanted. Yet, a conceptually, though not typologically, iden-
tical test to the one launched in Keck may perhaps be surmised, handing courts
and litigants a ‘check-list’ to determine the possible non-application of Article
49 EC in advance. Essentially, this test would seem to pronounce that any
restrictions to the provision of services, provided, first, that they apply without
distinction (Viacom II/Mobistar), second, that they either consist of minor
obstacles to market access (Viacom II) or failing that, affect in the same man-
ner in law and in fact both bilateral and unilateral service transactions
(Mobistar), do not fall foul of Article 49 EC. Thus, one is tempted to postulate
cautiously, the combination theory, which includes the discrimination and the
market access paradigms, truly appears to be the one underlying (at least this
section of) the free movement case-law. Far from conclusive proof admittedly,
but all the same, substantially more than conjecture.
5. Conclusion
It will be clear from the preceding, and this should definitely not be negated,
that though both Viacom II and Mobistar share a common core, in significant
87. Paras. 31–32 (emphasis added).
88. The Court did qualify this statement: ‘Admittedly, introducing a tax on pylons, masts and
antennae can make tariffs for mobile telephone communications to Belgium from abroad and
vice versa more expensive. However, national telephone service provision is, to the same extent,
subject to the risk that the tax will have an impact on tariffs.’ (para. 33).
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respects the similarities in both cases are overshadowed by the differences. The
way in which the national measures are tackled by the Court coincides in the
fact that, at heart, in both cases the classic Säger formula would no longer
serve. In Viacom II, it would have been possible to qualify the municipal tax as
a restriction in principle, only to save it through the trusted escape route of the
mandatory requirements doctrine. Apparently, there was a need for refine-
ment, for application of a yet unfamiliar novel standard. To the critical ob-
server, alas, the solution chosen much resembles an obscuring ruse. Judged by
its wording, the decisive paragraph has the distinct ring of a de minimis test.
The standard employed however is far from clear-cut. The fact that prior to
the crucial paragraph the measure’s non-distinctive application is asserted, con-
veys the impression of a Debauve89 approach resurfacing after all this time:
discriminating measures, whatever their manifestation, are outlawed, but all
others, whatever their factual impact, will stand the test. The marginality of
the Italian measure then in casu amounted to a superfluous datum.90 Such a
relapse is however less credible than that the reasoning and its outcome should
be regarded a characteristic emanation of the market access theorem.
Mobistar is much less murky. First of all, the Court manifestly chooses to
exclude the Belgian measures from the scope of Article 49 EC. This provides a
most suitable lead for launching a principled rule similar to Keck. The fact that
the disputed taxes affected Belgian and foreign providers of telecommunica-
tion services equally is a second factor adding momentum. The phrasing of the
decisive paragraphs in words strongly reminiscent of the crucial passage in
Keck, allude to a more fundamental issue being addressed. Not only do the
words ‘in law and in fact’ run parallel, the post-Keck case-law shows that the
concept of selling arrangements is increasingly being subordinated to a sub-
stantive assessment of the disputed measure’s impact on market access. It has
lead Weiler to present as the first proposition, the ‘general rule of free move-
ment’ of his ‘universal field theory’: ‘National provisions which do not affect
in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products
and of those from other Member States, must be justified by a public interest
over the free movement of goods.’91 In this respect, it could well be that in
89. Case 52/79, Procureur du Roi v. Marc J.V.C. Debauve and others, [1980] ECR 833.
90. In fact, it remains to be seen what the status of the de minimis rule in Viacom II implies. It could
match the type of unsubstantial barrier distinguished by AG Jacobs in Leclerc-Siplec. Equally
plausible is the possibility that the municipal tax, had it been applied to goods instead of
advertising services, would have escaped the prohibition laid down in Article 90 EC. In this
paradigm, it could be that the ECJ reads an equivalent of Article 90 EC into Article 49 EC. Less
likely is the possibility that a general de minimis rule is articulated, which would, for instance,
also apply to discriminatory barriers.
91. Weiler, cited supra note 17, p. 372. Barnard presents a similar ‘global test’ for both goods and
services, in which the central question in all cases would be ‘[…] whether the national measure
prevents or imposes a direct and substantial impediment of access to the market in another
Member State’ (Barnard, cited supra note 5, p. 53).
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Mobistar, the exact labelling of the disputed measures with the insufficiently
articulating, even materially obsolete, term of ‘selling arrangements’ proved
unnecessary.
A final caveat is in order. Both Viacom II and Mobistar concerned fiscal
measures. This may suffice to place both cases in a wholly different light. As
known, Article 90 EC spells out Community requirements to the Member
States’ tax regimes, but its scope is narrowed down to goods. Non-discrimina-
tory taxation of goods meets the conditions of that provision; an identical rule
applicable to services is nowhere to be found in the Treaty, but the general
wording of Article 49 EC could make up for this omission. The potential
impediment that national tax measures cause to service provision was already
affirmed in De Coster, but this case did not answer the question of why a non-
discriminatory tax would not at least run contrary to the spirit of the Internal
Market. Set against this background then, Viacom II was to stress that negli-
gible levies are permissible ipso facto, with Mobistar introducing a genuine dim
of Article 90 EC into the services framework. The two stages of analysis of
fiscal barriers would thus consist in the appraisal of their indistinct applicabil-
ity, in law and in fact, followed by a determination of any remaining factual
impact on trade, judged by the magnitude of the levy.
One swallow does not make a summer. Nonetheless, if the signalled cases
were to set a trend, would the complete redundancy of the Säger formula
ensue? For several reasons, we think it more plausible that it received a thor-
ough servicing, in which the span of Article 49 EC has been neatly fine-tuned.
Säger still is a point of reference in the aforementioned case-law, albeit increas-
ingly indirectly.92 If the dilution persists, this may change, but for the moment
this is where it is. Next, compared to Keck’s ‘[…] contrary to what has previ-
ously been decided […]’, the ECJ is much less outspoken. That judgment’s
explosiveness left legal scholarship shell-shocked, but subsequent case-law alle-
viated their suffering. If anything, Viacom II and Mobistar form an evolution
rather than a revolution, as post-Keck refinements in the goods case-law appear
to have been transplanted into Article 49 EC, if one accepts at all that the cases
represent such a transplant. The Court’s – above all – nuanced approach repre-
sents, or so we contend, a direct emanation of cross-fertilization between, if
not of the convergence of, the goods and services regimes. As advanced here,
the combined discrimination/market access theory fits as the single true prism
through which to observe hindrances to trade in both domains.
92. Cf. supra, note 80 and 85.
